En este trabajo diseño un posible marco de análisis fenomenológico para describir la experiencia de percibir la performance de que se cuenta un chiste. Partiendo del análisis de Michael Barber en su Religion and Humor as Emancipating Provinces of Meaning, Cham, Suiza, Springer / CARP, 2017 me ocupo de lo que sucede en el ámbito finito de sentido del humor. El chiste presenta una estructura de relato. El análisis del discurso y la semántica lingüística han avanzado en este tema de (...) manera relevante y me apropiaré de algunas de sus consideraciones sobre la estructura del chiste para mi indagación. En la segunda sección me dirigiré a tematizar la experiencia perceptiva de la situación mencionada. Puesto que adhiero a la posición filosófica que sostiene que la risa se produce por la percepción de una incongruencia entre dos historias que se parecen contar en el relato que es el chiste, relacionaré la experiencia de percibir (auditiva y visualmente) ese relato dislocado en la performance con los análisis de las síntesis pasivas temporales de Husserl. Finalmente, si logro explicitar que las síntesis pasivas operan en la experiencia del chiste, entonces mostraré que dicha experiencia es del orden de lo teatral. (shrink)

I come to grips with the deontological critique of constitutional proportionality that asserts that this doctrine ignores rights and slips into the utilitarian maximisation of societal interests. I...

Raz holds that necessarily all legal authorities, even de facto authorities, make a claim to legitimate authority. He does not say that legitimacy is a necessary property of law. This view, which I call the claim view, constitutes my focal point in this paper. Many commentators have criticized this view. I discuss and dismiss three critiques of the claim view: the verification critique (the claim view is not empirically confirmed), the legalistic critique (law claims legal authority, not moral authority), and (...) the semantic critique (legal obligations are semantically distinct from moral obligations). I submit that Raz equates the meaning of legal duties with that of moral duties and yet denies that legal statements entail moral propositions. In other words, I distinguish the semantic identity thesis from the semantic entailment thesis. Instead of a semantic interpretation of the claim view, I defend a presuppositional ascription of a general claim to moral authority to authoritative duty‐imposing and normatively committed uses of legal language by official spokesmen. I show that law’s claim to authority does not prove the truth of the sources thesis, because conceptual confusion or insincerity can affect the epistemic reliability of the propositions embodied in the claim, and because blatant immorality can altogether cancel law’s pragmatically presupposed claim to moral authority. I also argue that the claim view can only warrant two qualified versions of exclusive legal positivism, one of which is almost tautological, the other self‐contradictory. Finally, I suggest that exclusive legal positivism cannot be defended on conceptual grounds. (shrink)

The article distinguishes metaphysical from practical communitarianism. Metaphysical communitarianism is alleged to involve a concealed ideological element, which leads its adherents to stereotypes when trying to capture the essence of the modern self. The claim is examined that minorities, or other ethnic and cultural groups have collective rights, either moral or legal in nature. Justifications of collective rights resorting to the value of cultural identity are said to be in need of explaining why the proper way of protecting such value (...) is through rights. It is argued that practical communitarianism’s case for collective rights needs embracing meta-normative and normative relativism, whose application to political action yields consequences at odds with widespread ethical intuitions. (shrink)

© Mind Association 2017In Causation and Free Will Carolina Sartorio offers an intricate argument for the claim ‘that actual sequences are sufficient grounds for freedom: they ground freedom, and nothing is required to ground it other than themselves, or their own grounds’. On this view, free will with respect to a choice or action is not explained in terms of the agent’s having alternative possibilities. Like Harry Frankfurt, Sartorio rejects the Principle of Alternate Possibilities : Principle of Alternate Possibilities : (...) a person does something freely only if he could have done otherwise. As is well known, Frankfurt opposes PAP on the grounds that it is vulnerable to counter-examples. One of Sartorio’s variants of these examples is as follows: Frankfurt’s case: Frank has reasons to harm Furt and makes the choice on... (shrink)

:A good deal of contemporary moral nonconsequentialism assumes that agents have perfect knowledge about the various features and consequences of their options. This assumption is unrealistic. More often than not, moral agents can only assess with a certain degree of probability the factual circumstances that are morally relevant for their decision making. My aim in this essay is to discuss the problem of moral decisions under risk from the point of view of nonconsequentialism. Basically, I analyze how objective moral principles (...) can be transformed into subjective, decisional prescriptions, and argue that the standard nonconsequentialist approach to moral decision making, which focuses on probability thresholds, is wrong. In accordance with the fundamental postulates of nonconsequentialism, I seek to solve the problem of risk in moral choice by proposing a theory about the marginal moral value of various options. Actions can vary along various dimensions, and each of these dimensions can offer a different moral value function. Nonconsequentialist marginalism can level the playing field with consequentialism. Whereas consequentialism can simply borrow the notion of expected utility from economics, nonconsequentialism must introduce the notion of expectational obligation to formulate a general principle of moral choice under risk. I finally suggest that further empirical work is needed to delineate the shape of various moral value functions that are critical for applying the general principle of moral decision making under risk to well-known cases. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. DECISIONAL NONCONSEQUENTIALISM AND THE RISK SENSITIVITY OF OBLIGATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Horacio Spector DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000121Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

This volume brings together the central works of recent scholarship on the nature of rights, with contributions by some of the most prominent contemporary theorists in moral, legal, and political philosophy. With approaches ranging from the political to the historical, and from the analytical to the critical, this collection touches on the major conceptual and practical questions of this important field and also offers useful introductions to emerging issues in rights theory.

Contemporary political philosophers discuss the idea of freedom in terms of two distinctions: Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive liberty, and Skinner and Pettit's divide between liberal and republican liberty. In this essay I proceed to recast the debate by showing that there are two strands in liberalism, Hobbesian and Lockean, and that the latter inherited its conception of civil liberty from republican thought. I also argue that the contemporary debate on freedom lacks a perspicuous account of the various (...) conceptions of freedom, mainly because it leaves aside the classic contrast between natural liberty and civil liberty. Once we consider both the negative/positive distinction and the natural/civil one, we can classify all conceptions of freedom within four basic irreducible categories. In light of the resulting framework I show that there are two distinct conceptions of republican liberty, natural and civil, and that the former is coupled with an ideal of individual self-control. (shrink)

Eugenio Bulygin sostiene que la teoría de la clausura necesaria de los sistemas normativos de Joseph Raz se origina en el error de tomar a los permisos débiles o negativos como soluciones normativas. Bulygin cree que Raz omite advertir que los enunciados jurídicos son proposiciones normativas de segundo nivel y que las únicas permisiones capaces de cerrar el sistema jurídico son las permisiones fuertes o explícitas. En este trabajo sostengo que Raz se refiere a un tipo de clausura que es (...) inconcebible en el contexto de un programa reduccionista como el de Bulygin. Una vez que se visualiza que los enunciados jurídicos son proposiciones prácticas del primer nivel, parece obvio que la regla de clausura de Raz es un teorema deóntico. Eugenio Bulygin claims that Joseph Raz's theory on the necessary closure of normative systems derives from the error to take weak or negative permissions as normative solutions. Bulygin believes that Raz fails to notice that legal statements are second-level normative propositions and that the only permissions capable of closing a normative system are strong or explicit permissions. In this paper I argue that Raz focuses on one kind of closure that is inconceivable within the context of a reductionist program such as Bulygin's. Once one visualizes that legal statements are first-level practical claims, it seems obvious that Raz's closure rule is a deontic theorem. (shrink)

En este trabajo critico la interpretación moralizada de la obligación política en Hobbes que defiende Luciano Venezia. Exploro una lectura diferente que evita una dicotomía tajante entre las razones prudenciales y las razones morales y subraya en cambio la discontinuidad entre la normatividad subjetiva de la ley natural y la normatividad objetiva de la ley positiva. Sostengo que el contrato de sujeción política establece obligaciones objetivas recién cuando el soberano exige el cumplimiento de los contratos. La obligación política es entonces (...) una forma de obligación jurídica. Además, enfatizo que la comunidad moral de Hobbes solo es posible dentro del Estado. In this paper, I criticize Luciano Venezia's moralized interpretation of the Hobbesian concept of political obligation. I explore a different reading that avoids a clear-cut dichotomy between prudential and moral reasons and underscores instead the discontinuity between natural law's subjective normativity and civil law's objective normativity. I contend that the pact of political subjection establishes objective obligations only when the sovereign requires the fulfillment of contracts. Political obligation is then a form of legal obligation. In addition, I emphasize that Hobbes's moral community is only possible within the State. (shrink)

A rational moral code must satisfy the condition of completeness. This same condition applies to a set of moral rights, where it takes the form of requiring that all the rights in that set be compossible: that their respective correlatively entailed duties be jointly fulfillable. Such joint fulfillability is guaranteed only by a set of fully differentiated individual domains. And if moral rights are to play any independent role in moral reasoning - any role logically independent of the values that (...) bring persons into conflict - those domains must be determined by rules which are not derived from those values. (shrink)

En 15 apretados artículos y 4 capítulos, el presente libro representa una puesta al día de los conocimientos que en la actualidad se manejan para valorar y sintetizar el aporte de esta cultura al legado cultural pan andino. La obra, iniciativa de los profesores Rivera y Kolata, constituye el resultado final de uno de los simposios del LI Congreso de Americanistas, celebrado en la ciudad de Santiago en julio del año 2003.Es el mérito indiscutido de los dos editores el haber (...) logrado obtener un .. (shrink)

Including an edited transcription of a colloquium on Sander's life and work, this title contains plates selected from the J. Paul Getty Museum's collection. Sander's works exemplify the contradictory nature of early 20th century Germany.

While ancient civilizations worshipped strong, active emotions, modern societies have favored more peaceful attitudes, especially within the democratic process. We have largely forgotten the struggle to make use of _thymos_, the part of the soul that, following Plato, contains spirit, pride, and indignation. Rather, Christianity and psychoanalysis have promoted mutual understanding to overcome conflict. Through unique examples, Peter Sloterdijk, the preeminent posthumanist, argues exactly the opposite, showing how the history of Western civilization can be read as a suppression and return (...) of rage. By way of reinterpreting the _Iliad_, Alexandre Dumas's _Count of Monte Cristo_, and recent Islamic political riots in Paris, Sloterdijk proves the fallacy that rage is an emotion capable of control. Global terrorism and economic frustrations have rendered strong emotions visibly resurgent, and the consequences of violent outbursts will determine international relations for decades to come. To better respond to rage and its complexity, Sloterdijk daringly breaks with entrenched dogma and contructs a new theory for confronting conflict. His approach acknowledges and respects the proper place of rage and channels it into productive political struggle. (shrink)

The singular position of Montesquieu's political philosophy seems to raise the question: Isn't the opposition between republicanism and liberalism a largely artificial one? On the one hand, the description of the republican vivere civile in the Spirit of the Laws testifies to the important ties that exist between Montesquieu and the tradition of ?civic humanism?. However, this apparent theoretical proximity between Montesquieu and the British Neo-Harringtonians ought not to be taken too far, obscuring the deep divergences that differentiate their respective (...) positions, notably when it comes to the interpretation of history. Montesquieu's break from the republican tradition is exemplified by his rejection of its conception of freedom rooted in the citizens' necessary participation in power. But in the end, this does not enable us to conclude that he subscribes to a purely liberal theory. The British model shows that even if direct participation in the exercise of power is not necessary for the existence of liberty, a certain level of civic involvement and public awareness is needed. The liberal opposition between positive and negative liberty, political autonomy and enjoyment of rights without interference must therefore be transcended. (shrink)

The didactics of astronomy is a relatively young field with respect to that of other sciences. Historical issues have most often been part of the teaching of astronomy, although that often does not stem from a specific didactics. The teaching of astronomy is often subsumed under that of physics. One can easily consider that, from an educational standpoint, astronomy requires the same mathematical or physical strategies. This approach may be adequate in many cases but cannot stand as a general principle (...) for the teaching of astronomy. This chapter offers in a first part a brief overview of the status of astronomy education research and of the role of the history and philosophy of science (HPS) in astronomy education. In a second part, it attempts to illustrate possible ways to structure the teaching of astronomy around its historical development so as to pursue a quality education and contextualized learning. (shrink)

La filosofa de la liberacin latinoamericana es expresin de la realidad social e histrica de Latinoamrica. Los contrastes y la desigualdad se expresan en su discurso, tanto como en el historicismo, la sociologa y la teologa latinoamericanas.

How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in . 'If A, then B' must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. In this article we propose a formulation of , which unlike some of its predecessors, is compatible with our best theory of belief revision, the so-called AGM theory , chapters 1-5 for a survey). The new test, which, (...) we claim, encodes some of the crucial insights defended by F. P. Ramsey in , is used to study the conditionals epistemically validated by the AGM postulates. Our notion of validity is compared with the notion of negative validity used by Gärdenfors in . It is observed that the notions of PV and NV will in general differ and that when these differences arise it is the notion of PV that is preferable. Finally we compare our formulation of the Ramsey test with a previous formulation offered by Gärdenfors . We show that any attempt to interpret as delivering acceptance conditions for Ramsey's conditionals is doomed to failure. (shrink)

O objetivo desta reflexão é estabelecer um diálogo entre os espaços da educação, filosofia e política, buscando construir pontes entre eles. Seu embasamento teórico se refere à crítica ao capitalismo e ao conceito de reificação, a partir de autores da Escola de Frankfurt, de Foucault e de Benjamin. Um episódio ocorrido em 29 de abril de 2015 foi escolhido para análise por representar um evento paradoxal nos campos e conceitos apontados. Concluímos que é necessário se repensar novas ações entre as (...) práticas educativas, as ações políticas e os saberes filosóficos, nos quais seus sujeitos sociais tenham disponibilidade ao diálogo, ao respeito e à democracia. (shrink)

La intensión del presente trabajo es la de explorar la relación medios-fines exponiendo que la misma se presenta en la obra de John Dewey como camino y horizonte coherente y consistente de su propuesta filosófica y educativa. La relación medios-fines dirige la investigación llevándonos a una comprensión del conocimiento como practica evaluativa y transformadora. Esta concepción epistemológica sienta las bases para repensar la educación y la democracia y brinda elementos suficientes para superar las dicotomías pensamiento - emoción, hechos - valores (...) y sociedad-individuo. El método utilizado es la investigación. La educación y la democracia son los espacios en los cuales la relación medios-fines, ya sea en su fase natural o adaptativa, ya sea en su fase moral o critica, ya sea en su fase social o publica, encuentra unidad y continuidad. En la educación de, por y para la democracia la inteligencia y la actividad se interrelacionan mutuamente. (shrink)